After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran did not change its policy towards Japan, which was not only perceived separately from the West, but was also a major customer of its raw resources and a potential economic donor. In turn, Japan had to pursue the policy of unstable balancing towards Iran, by coordinating its Middle Eastern policy with its strategic ally, the United States, and simultaneously trying to preserve close ties with Iran, which were important from the point of view of maintaining energy security. The article shows how Japan tried to maneuver between these two countries: it took steps to realize large-scale economic projects in Iran’s energy sector, to limit sanctions, which were minimal on its side, etc., and simultaneously participated in the anti-Iran campaign pursued by Western countries under the pressure of the US, or under the influence of major crises in the region (for example, the Iran-Iraq War). Japan continues to face this “Middle Eastern dilemma” in present times as well. It could partly have been solved by the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear program in 2015, were it not for the fact that, two years later, under the US administration of Donald Trump, the US-Iran relations worsened significantly. Nevertheless, in this period, Japan successfully tried its mediatory potential, making use of its good relations with both parties of the conflict: on the one hand, it refused to participate in the US operation in the Strait of Hormuz, on the other, it halted the unfreezing of Iran’s funds in its banks, which had been blocked after the introduction of sanctions by the US administration of Donald Trump. Recently, the activization of China in the region has become a factor of risk for Japan’s Middle Eastern policy, as China tries to use the weaking positions of the US and to occupy the vacuum that was left in its wake, which is illustrated by the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement between Beijing and Tehran in March 2021. This forces Japan to deliberately strengthen its positions and expand its presence in Iran. It appears that Japan’s approaches to solving the “Middle Eastern dilemma” deserve special attention in the future as well.

Fujiwara Seika (藤原惺窩, 1561–1619) has often attracted scholarly attention as one of the founders of Neo-Confucianism in Japan. Yet his substantial literary oeuvre, which includes works in both literary Sinitic (Jp. kanbun 漢文) and Japanese, remains largely unexplored. Just like most of his educated contemporaries, Seika was well-versed in kanbun composition and left us with a considerable number of Sinitic poems (Jp. 漢詩 kanshi), but the few modern scholars who have commented on his verse have been quite critical in their evaluation of his poetic prowess. According to such scholars, Seika’s kanshi suffer from several serious defects, including a derivative and uninventive diction, a lack of individuality, and an inability to fruitfully engage with indigenous poetic material.

This study turns to a selection of Fujiwara Seika’s Sinitic poems to cast doubt on such claims. It begins by surveying scholarly opinion on Seika’s verse, proceeds to analyze his kanshi poetics by focusing on diction, tone, and the use of Japanese poetic material, and concludes with a brief discussion of Seika’s ideal of “living verse” (Jp. 活句 kakku). The study argues that, far from being a “bad” poet, Seika was capable of producing innovative, personal, and eclectic verse at a stage in the development of kanbun literature often described as one of blandness, literary mimicry, and slavish imitation of Chinese precedent. In so doing, this study challenges conventional scholarly narratives of Fujiwara Seika’s—and, by extension, other early Tokugawa poets’—place in the history of Japanese belles-lettres and points to the importance of treating the kanbun corpus as an academic subject no less serious than the vernacular tradition.

Based on comparative study of published Russian and Japanese sources, the article describes the history of the Russian settlement on the island of Urup in 1795–1805. First, it clarifies the goals of the foundation of the settlement and the reasons for its liquidation. Founded at the initiative of the Siberian merchant Grigorii Shelekhov, the Russian settlement played an important role both in Russo-Japanese relations and in the policy of the Japanese government towards the Ainu and their lands, especially in the southern Kuril Islands, at the turn of the 18^th and 19^th centuries. Russians founded the settlement in the view of future trade opportunities with Japan, since, a few years earlier, the Russian envoy Adam Laxman had received a permission to enter the port of Nagasaki to continue negotiations. In the beginning, Russians managed to start exchange of Japanese goods and supplies with the Ainu. After Japanese governmental expedition reached Iturup in 1798, however, information about relations between the Russians and the Ainu led to the transfer of the northeast Hokkaido, Kunashir, and Iturup under the direct control of the bakufu, as well as influenced the nature of Japanese policy towards the local population, the Ainu. The desire to expel the Russians from Urup and thereby stop their relations with the Ainu of the southern Kuril Islands led to the decision of the Japanese government to turn Iturup into a natural fortress and forbid the locals to leave the island, and the Russians and Ainu of the northern and middle Kuril Islands to come there. At the same time, the long stay of Russian settlers on Urup prevented the spread of Japanese influence north of Iturup.

Japan has long been a country closed to Russia. According to some sources, acquaintance with its inhabitants began in the 17^th century, and we received the first direct information about the way of life of the Japanese from the descriptions of those who explored the Far East in the 18^th century, as well as from Russian sailors. A particularly invaluable contribution to the question of understanding Japan at the initial stage was made by captain V.M. Golovnin, who was captured by the Japanese. Studying a country means not only focusing on political or economic relations, but also on the psychological perception of the inhabitants of the other country. This level – the level of soft power – is also important for building long-term good neighborly relations, affecting the mentality and the ability to perceive each other in a tolerant way. The purpose of this article is to analyze various sources, both academic and everyday ones, to characterize the image of Japan that has developed in the minds of Russian citizens. To achieve this goal, a phenomenological approach is used in the context of the “perception of the other”. The authors consistently prove the dominance of historical memory in the development of relations, which proceeded according to the type of non-military rivalry and conflict resolution. The logic and structure of the article is a movement from the analysis of relations between the inhabitants of our countries, starting with the notes of navigators of the 19^th century, towards the analysis of the dynamics of current relations, and, finally, the discussion of the attitudes and perceptions of Japanese culture by the Russian youth. The authors conclude that the image of Japan in the minds and mentality of Russian citizens is formed according to the agonistic type, which implies the acceptance of the other, and not rejection, as is the case of the “perception of the other” according to the polemos type.

The election of V.V. Putin for a new presidential term in 2012 and his further foreign policy initiatives affected the intensification of Russia’s foreign policy in general, as well as its Japanese direction. The article attempts to highlight the development of Russian-Japanese relations in the period of 2012–2022, including the phase of aggravation of relations after the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022 and Japan’s accession to the US anti-Russian sanctions, as well as the role and influence of China on the bilateral Russian-Japanese format, the East Asian region, the specifics of Chinese-American relations in the context of the “trade war” in the Japanese dimension, etc. Based on the published works of leading Russian experts, the author examines the dynamics of mutual perception of the images of Russia and Japan at the level of Russian and Japanese public opinion. Particular attention is paid to the study of the evolution of Russian-Japanese trade and economic, military-political, energy, Arctic, and humanitarian contacts. The paper traces the features of Russian, Japanese and Chinese motivations regarding regional security issues, attitudes towards the Ukrainian events, including the Russian special military operation, Moscow’s reaction to anti-Russian sanctions, towards the pressure from the United States and their allies. In general, the problem of the evolution of the notional triangle “Russia – Japan – China” at the present stage, the deformation of its key elements and the prospects for further development are formulated.

The author focuses on the coverage of Russian-Japanese contacts in the areas of regional security before and after February 24, 2022, including the South Kuril options, as well as the analysis of hidden possible Japanese political motivations during the rule of Shinzō Abe regarding the problems of the deepening of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership and the projections of this partnership on the security of Japan and the Japanese-American military-political alliance. An important aspect of the work is the coverage of the dynamics of the Russian-Japanese political relations in the light of the Russian leadership designating Japan as an “unfriendly state” and the further development of bilateral Russian-Japanese and Russian-Chinese models of interaction in the Asia-Pacific region.

This article examines the transformation of ancestor worship in the context of socio-political and religious conditions and identifies the characteristics of worship in contemporary Japanese society and the changes in the form of practices and functions of this worship occurring today.

Ancestor worship is not a phenomenon unique to traditional societies: in 21^st century Japan, ancestor worship rituals are practiced by a large part of the population. After World War II, Japanese veneration practices underwent significant changes. The post-war modernization and urbanization of Japanese society played a major role in these changes, leading to the breakdown of the traditional family system. The concept of ancestor itself changes: the concept of ancestor tends to expand and begins to extend bilaterally (to both the husband and wife lines). There has been a transition from the “obligatory” concept of an ancestor, which includes all deceased ancestors in the direct line of succession regardless of personal preferences, to an “optional” one, which limits the concept of “ancestor” to close relatives whose memories are dear to the descendant. With the change in the concept of the ancestor, the functions of ancestor veneration also undergo a transformation: the former functions of veneration rituals contributed to the stability of the ie system, while the new ones consist in relieving psychological tensions between the living and the dead and bringing comfort to particular people. There has been a “privatization” of ancestor veneration, that is, a growing dominance of personal functions in veneration. Diversification of family types, especially pronounced in the first decades of the 21st century, is also reflected in the rites of ancestor veneration: alternatives to traditional funerals and new forms of burial and storage of remains are appearing.

The article concludes that, despite changes in the functions and forms of ancestor worship, the place given to the dead in their lives by the living remains invariably important. And the individualization of veneration practices and the undying belief of a large part of the Japanese population in the power of ancestor spirits indicate that the ancestor cult in contemporary Japan is apparently at the next stage of its unfolding, but by no means of extinction.

The Ukrainian crisis, which came into its active phase in February 2022, led to the collapse of Russia’s relations with many countries, and Japan was no exception. The Japanese government expressed strong criticism of Russia’s actions and joined the anti-Russian sanctions with, probably, most vigor, compared to any other Asian nation. This makes the question about the reasons for such course pursued by Tokyo vis-à-vis Russia a particularly timely one. In Russia, there is a widespread opinion that such position held by Tokyo is caused mostly by pressure from the United States. Yet such view seems to be a gross simplification. This article attempts to analyze the positions of various participants of the Japanese foreign policy making process about the events unfolding in Ukraine. It shows that, even though all key parties, irrespective of their political orientation, take a critical stance towards the actions of the Russian Federation, their statements show some nuances reflecting their ideological priorities. For example, the ruling LDP emphasizes solidarity with the US; its junior coalition partner, Komeito, stresses humanitarian aspects and the role of the UN; the Japan Innovation Party criticizes the government for indecisiveness and calls for more active military policy, while the left-wing populist Reiwa Shinsengumi even refused to support the relevant Diet resolution to demonstrate its principled stance to the voters. There are indeed opinions which can arguably be called apologetic towards Russia. However, those holding such opinions are but a minority and are hardly able to alter the position of the government or the Japanese public as a whole. There is a virtual consensus about the issue, and nuances in the positions of major political forces are inconsequential. One would be justified to assume that, under any probable domestic political situation, Tokyo will not change its policy about the matter.

The article reviews the book by Alexander Mescheryakov “Japan. Chasing the Wind of centuries” (Moscow: Lingvistika, 2022, 512 p. ISBN 978-5-91922-098-5). The monograph is a collection of the author’s recent articles. The range of topics and the chronological coverage are extraordinarily wide, with many phenomena of Japanese history and culture considered throughout centuries and portrayed in enormous diversity and variability. At the same time, the fates of individual people are not lost in the context of large-scale historical and cultural changes, and the author carefully brings us their voices. This makes the book a real journey in time.