In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Soviet Japanese relations were going through difficult times. The Mongolian issue and border incidents continually worsened bilateral contacts. In a state of hostility and open confrontation, the authorities of both countries detained and rummaged fishing vessels, artificially whipped up spy mania, increased pressure on leftwing elements (Japan) and arrested those who were associated with the enemy side through scientific or other work (the USSR). Limiting himself to two events from Soviet Japanese history of this time, the author analyzes how Soviet Japanese relations and the atmosphere of mutual perception changed in the period between the end of the Khalkhin Gol River conflict (1939) and the signing of the Neutrality Pact (1941). Using reports from employees of the USSR Plenipotentiary Mission in Tokyo as an example, the author examines how Japan’s attempt to begin building “new relations” with the USSR affected the position of Soviet diplomats and influenced the degree and quality of interaction between them and the Japanese. It is noted that, by developing cooperation with the Soviet diplomatic mission and paying attention to its staff, both in public and through personal invitations to cultural events, the Japanese authorities sought to emphasize the progressive nature of bilateral relations and create a positive image around them. This approach formed a part of Japan’s foreign policy, conditioned by the international context, in which maintaining relative stability was in the interests of both sides. However, the Japanese “sincerity” encountered by the Soviet representatives often aroused skepticism. For every step or sign of attention from the Japanese, the Plenipotentiary Mission urged its personnel to be vigilant: both the experience of past relations and the perception that changes in Japan’s position towards the USSR were temporary and situational were involved. In some cases, this distrust was intensified by the diplomats’ own stereotypes about the Japanese, rooted in racial, physical, and everyday prejudices.

In the late 19th — early 20th centuries, Japanese Buddhism was going through difficult times. Institutional crisis, loss of governmental support, competition with Shinto and Christianity, persecution caused by both political and social factors contributed to the consolidation of Japanese sangha and establishment of close relations with supporters abroad. A significant role in this process was played by the so-called general journals (sôgô zasshi) — multitopic periodicals comprised of articles on politics, science, society and culture, which functioned as a platform for free exchange of opinions, both open and anonymous. Buddhist oriented journals thus attracted both religious activists and scholars of Buddhology to their pages, while simultaneously exchanging contacts with foreign periodicals and promoting cooperation.

 The result was an impressive “Buddhist network” of journals, where representatives of various Buddhist schools could discuss pressing issues together, the works of young Japanese Buddhologists were published, and articles by their Western colleagues re printed. Letters from Buddhists from other countries, such as India, Siam, and Ceylon, as well as ones by European sympathizers, were also published. Many such periodicals had a relatively short lifespan, but at least 800 journals are known. These included inter sectarian and individual schools’ bulletins, regional journals, such as People’s Teaching (Kokkyô), and female oriented journals, such as Buddhist Woman ( Bukkyô fujin). All of them served as means of building strong horizontal ties and supporting Japanese Buddhism.

One of the important functions of the “Buddhist network” was to provide information support for missionary work by Japanese Buddhists and coverage of sangha’s participation in important international cultural events. Paradoxically, despite governmental pressure, Japanese Buddhism managed to spread significantly abroad. This article examines said missions and their coverage.

The article is devoted to the problems of Russian-Japanese relations on the Chinese Eastern Railway at the initial stage of its history. Workers from Japan were not invited to build the road, but the Japanese were already among the first settlers in the city of Harbin, founded in 1898 by the Chinese Eastern Railway Society. After a short break caused by the Russo-Japanese War, bilateral relations were quickly resto red. In 1906, as the Russian troops withdrew from Manchuria, the Japanese began to return to the Chinese Eastern Railway. Since 1907, Japanese officials, entrepreneurs, cultural and sports figures from Japan began to take an active part in the socio-political, economic, and cultural life of the city of Harbin. It was here that the first “Russian-Japanese Society” was created. The Japanese in Harbin were mainly engaged in such areas as trade, medicine, entertainment, and domestic service. An important component of bilateral interaction was cooperation in the railway sector. Due to tradition and the inaccessibility of sources, the history of the Japanese population of Har bin is poorly studied in Russian historiography. The aim of this work is to reconstruct the historical picture and identify the problems of the Japanese presence in Harbin and Russian-Japanese interaction on the Chinese Eastern Railway in the period bet ween the Russo-Japanese and the First World Wars. The study is based on materials from the Harbin periodical press, with the involvement of materials found in the arc hives collected by the researcher of the Chinese Eastern Railway E.K. Nilus. The information and analytical materials published in the newspapers Harbinskii Vestnik (“Harbin Bulletin”), Harbin, Novaya Zhizn’ (“New Life”), and Man'chzhurskii Kur'er (“Manchurian Courier”), especially advertising, allow one to get an idea of the com position of the Japanese community, the occupations of the Japanese and some problems of Russian-Japanese relations in 1906—1914. The study of development of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Japanese, their coexistence and cooperation with Russians in Harbin will expand knowledge of the history of the Chinese Eastern Rail way and achieve a more complete and objective picture of the history of Russian-Japanese relations in the 20th century.

The article is devoted to the definition of the role and importance of the participation of the indigenous peoples of the Far East in the formation and development of Russian-Japanese trade during the 18th —19th centuries. The traditional crafts of the aborigines of the Far Eastern Territory were of undoubted interest to Russian entrepreneurs who sought to expand trade relations with neighboring Japan. Before the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855, Russian merchants in need of certain goods resorted to the intermediary services of the Ainu, who exchanged Japanese goods for Russian ones. The article provides concrete facts about the indirect participation of the aborigines of the Far East in Russian-Japanese trade, information about goods, prices, supply channels, etc. It notes the changes in the life of the aboriginal population under the influence of barter trade, their transition to settled life, borrowing of traditions of everyday life from Russians, and their reorientation to new occupations, influenced by the needs of foreign trade. In particular, it discusses the specific features of traditional occupations of the aborigines of the Far East: the Taz, the Negidals, the Oroks, the Nivkh, the Gilyaks, the Tungus, the Goldi, the Orochen, etc., as well as ways of their involvement in barter trade and realization of products of traditional crafts in the Japanese market. The article specifically focuses on the participation of the Ainu subjects of Japan and the Russian Empire in Russian-Japanese trade, notes the peculiarities of the attitude of Russian and Japanese authorities to the Ainu, their interaction with Russian entrepreneurs. It also notes the participation of Koreans and the Chinese residing in the Russian Far East in Russian-Japanese trade. The article emphasizes the importance of Russian entrepreneurs’ selling furs, fish, seafoods, seaweed, ginseng, marine mammals products obtained through barter trade from the Far Eastern aborigines in the Japanese market. It analyzes the bilateral international trade treaties between the Russian Empire and Japan in the studied period. The article uses rare pre-revolutionary archival documents, as well as sources in Russian, English, French, Spanish, and German.

Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835—1901) is considered a “great enlightener.” This means that, after the opening of Japan in the mid19th century, he did a lot to introduce Western culture and civilization to the Japanese. Many studies have been devoted to analyzing Fukuzawa's achievements in the field of enlightenment. At the same time, Fukuzawa's personality has not attracted much attention, which seems a great omission to us. The Meiji Revolution was not only an era of great reforms, but also a time of formation of a new type of Japanese, who broke with the past and aspired to other horizons. In this regard, Fukuzawa's personality is of great interest, because it was he who set an example of what a “new” Japanese should be.

Fukuzawa's personality is poorly reflected in memoir literature. People who knew Fukuzawa in childhood and youth did not leave memoirs. The memoir genre was not widespread in Japan at that time. As for the second half of Fukuzawa's life, when he had already entered the public arena, his close circle consisted of his students and people who were much younger than him. The genre of memoirs gradually took root in Japan, and Fukuzawa's students left us some information useful for understanding his personality. But the students' recollections of their teacher are mostly laudatory, which does not contribute to an adequate understanding of Fukuzawa's character. However, he “took care” of himself — in his declining years, in 1898, he published his autobiography under the title Fukuo Jiden, or Autobiography of the Elder Fukuzawa. It gives a vivid idea not only of the spiritual atmosphere of Tokugawa and Meiji Japan but also depicts the human type who was the overthrower of old foundations and the creator of new ones. It was Fukuzawa's autobiography that served as the main source for writing this work.

The article explores practical and ideological aspects of economic policy of the Japanese government during the three year tenure of Kishida Fumio as Prime Minister of Japan. It analyzes the theoretical concept of the “new form of capitalism,” which F. Kishida made the basis of his political image, and its connection with practical politics, noting a significant gap between the ideological characteristics of this concept and current economic policy. The emphasis on increasing the share of labor as a factor of production in the income structure, on the inclusiveness of the economic system, and on the importance of distribution relations has not been accompanied by major changes in the tax and budget policy, labor relations, and relations between government and business. The role of the driving force of socioeconomic change has in fact been assigned to technological progress and the evolution of social practices. This con firms the nature of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party as a political force based on the conservative consensus and not inclined to radical steps and bold institutional transformations.

 The article describes practical economic policy of Fumio Kishida's cabinets as succeeding that of the second half of the 2010s, in particular, the set of views and measures associated with the name of the then leader of the LDP, Prime Minister Shinzô Abe (“Abenomics”). It is noted that continuity was characteristic of the main aspects of fiscal, monetary, and institutional policies of Kishida cabinets. Also, the effect of the pursued policy turned out to be higher than that of the predecessors. The period of Kishida's premiership witnessed a number of new aspects in the government's economic approaches. At the same time, it is noted that, for the most part, they were nothing more than a change in priorities within the old framework or merely marks of a new ideological and conceptual formulation. Significant changes have not been seen so far in macroeconomic regulation or in the long term priorities of the fiscal strategy of the Japanese government.

The article examines Japan's policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the aftermath of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. A core dilemma in Ja pan's approach lies in balancing its loyalty to Arab nations — crucial for securing energy supplies and avoiding a repeat of the 1973 “oil shock” — with its alignment to the United States' pro-Israel stance. These conflicting priorities make Japan's diplomatic behavior in this context particularly significant.

 Using official documents and statements from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the author outlines Tokyo's official position, explores its divergence from U.S. policy, and traces its historical motivations. To highlight Japan’s strategic challenges during the conflict's escalation, the study employs the case study method. Two key cases are analyzed: Japan’s immediate response to the Hamas attack and subsequent Israeli military actions, and Nagasaki City Hall’s decision not to invite Israel’s ambassador to its peace ceremony on August 9, 2024. These cases were selected for their illustration of Japan’s difficulties in reconciling with the U.S. position as its main ally. The author analyzes these cases by employing elements of event analysis. Specifically, the most significant verbal and physical actions are identified, and for each action, the subject (actor) and the object (audience) are clearly defined. The analysis identifies five key audiences that shape Japan's policy regarding this conflict: the U.S. government, Arab governments, UN member states, neighboring South-east Asian countries, and, importantly, Japan’s domestic public, which strongly favors pacifism.

The study concludes that, while Japan’s diplomacy during the 2023—2024 conflict could not satisfy all these audiences simultaneously, it was nonetheless relatively successful in navigating these competing pressures.

The article examines the contents of the book “Worlds of Japanese Culture” by E.L. Skvortsova and A.L. Lutsky (Moscow, St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2025. 582 p. Series “Tree of Meanings.” ISBN 978-5-98712-499-4). The review outlines the main topics addressed by the authors of the book: the development of Japanese philosophy and sociology in the modern period, the problems faced by Japanese society in the 21st century, the essence and characteristic features of Japanese civilization. According to the author of the review, the book is a valuable contribution to the study of modern philosophy and culture of Japan as a whole.

In the world ranking of gender inequality by the World Economic Forum, Ja pan fell from the 80th place in 2006 to the 114th in 2017 and the 118th in 2024. Although this ranking is somewhat arbitrary, it shows that the problem of gender inequality in the country is far from being resolved. Despite the significant increase in the level of education of Japanese women, in many areas of life, their role is much more modest than that of men. Since the late 1980s, the government has been taking measures to change the situation, but, so far, there has been no drastic progress. Gender asymmetry is particularly acute in areas such as economics and politics. At the same time, it is impossible not to see the huge changes taking place in society and directly or indirectly affecting the position of women. This is manifested in a departure from the customary values, traditionally perceived as the basis for the formation of Japanese society. Although there is still strong traditionalism in culture and dominant patriarchal masculine attitudes in the public consciousness, a revision of gender stereotypes and roles is ta king place. Marital and family relations are gradually losing their importance, the institution of marriage is experiencing a certain crisis, the scale of conflicts between representatives of different generations is expanding, and there is an increase in social apathy among young Japanese, which is manifested, among other things, in a decrease in their interest in the opposite sex and marriage. This leads to a drop in the birth rate, an increase in the age of marriage, and a reduction in the number of children in the family. Among young Japanese women, the proportion of those who, having received good education, strive for professional growth, is growing, but this presents them with a difficult choice — marriage and family, or career, since it is extremely difficult to combine a full-fledged job with the burden of family responsibilities. This situation manifests itself in the pattern of Japanese women's participation in the economy, characterized by a sharp decline in the proportion of permanent workers among them after the age of 30 (the age of marriage and childbirth).