In this article, we observe the evolution of Gorky’s views on the events of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). From the beginning, he perceived it as an antinational, cruel, and pointless event. In his letters to relatives and friends, Gorky exposed the predatory nature of this “adventure” and false official propaganda. The writer attentively studied books about China and Japan, intensified his publishing activities, trying to acquaint his readers with literature and history of the Eastern countries. He did not support the policy of incitement of hatred towards Japan, and was opposed to the complex of “civilized supremacy” of Europeans. 6 years later, in his short story “Complaints” (1911), Gorky returned to the events of the Russo-Japanese War, but he gave them a completely different interpretation. The writer’s attention was focused on the “Russian Question”: using the example of the attitude of soldiers towards war, he critically evaluated such qualities of the Russian psyche as passivism and fatalism. In his novel “The Life of Klim Samgin”, the Russo-Japanese War becomes the catalyst of the collapse of the Russian state. This was expressed in bright artistic techniques in Gorky’s depiction of the demonstration on the Palace Square on January 30, 1904 and the mobilization of the replacement troops in Staraya Rousse. Depending on ideological tasks, the attitude towards the Russo-Japanese War and its covering changed. Gorky moved towards ideological and philosophical generalizations and considered the Russo-Japanese War in a historical perspective.

The influence of historical memory about Japanese aggression in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) on contemporary Japan-China relations is still very noticeable. Therefore, it is important to look into fundamental reasons for the long-lasting disagreement between the countries on the events of the war. The key here is to understand why Chinese society still believes that the Japanese side has not fully realized the tragedy of the events and has not sufficiently apologized for its military actions, while Japanese people are displeased with constant reminders from China about the past. The article seeks to address this controversy and to clarify whether the feeling of guilt could be seen in post-war Japan and how and whether it was expressed on different levels, from the Emperor to common Japanese people. The article is divided into two main sections. The first section is focused on the problems of moral and material compensation to China after the war: the process of settling these issues is described, while putting an emphasis on the circumstances which led to major problems in mutual understanding and acceptance of Japan’s apologies by China. In the second section, the development of historical memory in Japan in the post-war decades is investigated. After analyzing Chinese and Japanese sources, the author comes to the conclusion that, in addition to the mentioned issues with apologies and reparations, gradual fading away of historical memory in Japan after the war (partially caused by the post-war social trauma) also contributed to the understanding that the feeling of guilt in Japanese society was not sufficient. At the same time, visiting Yasukuni Shrine to commemorate the souls of those who died for the Emperor does not necessarily mean that Japanese people do not feel guilty for the aggression.

The socio-economic consequences of regional unevenness remain one of the major problems of Japan's development in the 21st century. Despite some success in regional economic policy, the main quantitative indicators of territorial-economic proportions/imbalances have changed little over the past 30 years. However, a number of internal and external factors have made it necessary to adjust approaches to regional strategic planning. These include globalization and the changing positioning of Japan in the world market, the partial loss of competitive positions in Asian markets, and increased competition between “international” cities for foreign investment. Internal factors include the decline of the Japanese population at a rate higher than previously expected, changes in people's lifestyles and shifts in their value system, the increasing importance of such of its components as stability, security, favorable environmental conditions, attractive landscapes, and diversification of lifestyles. The new national spatial strategy of the 21st century is based on the idea of creating a multi-layered “compact and networked territorial structure”, which should ensure the availability of social services for residents of all localities by optimizing the social infrastructure and forming “new urban cores”. The economic development of regions should focus on the development of industries that rely on local resources and take into account local specifics, as well as the creation of “ecosystems” of innovations. Along with reviving the regional and rural economy, Japan's new spatial strategy also aims to adjust the concentration of population and economic potential of large megacities (primarily Tokyo) and at the same time strengthen their global competitiveness. As necessary conditions for achieving ambitious goals, the Spatial Strategy calls for achieving economic growth, increasing industrial productivity, building innovation through regional resources and interregional cooperation, increasing the participation of women and older people in work and public life, using modern “smart” technologies and sharing economy formats. The traditional imperative in formulating Japan's spatial development strategy remains the obvious desire to solve the problems of territorial unevenness in conjunction with solving other socio-economic problems of the country, in particular the problems of ecology and demographic decline (which is especially noticeable in the regions), issues of improving production and social infrastructure.

The article is devoted to the problems of hydrogen energetics development in Japan and various aspects of Japan’s domestic and foreign policy in this direction. Renewable energy technologies are evolving increasingly actively, and hydrogen takes one of the leading places among them. This is especially important for countries with a deficit of fossil energy resources (coal, oil, and natural gas), which Japan belongs to. The significance of traditional fuel energy decreases as the economic efficiency of renewable energy sources increases, but the expansion of the latter also faces natural (climatic) and technological limitations. In this context, hydrogen will be able to be the bedrock for the future power engineering if the challenges of its transportation, storage, and safe use for energy production can be solved. For the successful development of hydrogen energy in Japan, several questions should be clearly answered. First: what is the preferable way to obtain hydrogen (national production in a traditional or "green" way, import, establishment of joint ventures with foreign partners. Second: which industries are most preferable for the introduction of hydrogen technologies? And third: is the commercial efficiency (payback) achievable for the construction and operation of various hydrogen infrastructure facilities? The establishment of the international legal regime for the export/import of hydrogen is also of great importance, given the considerable complexity and danger of such operations. Energy security is crucial for Japan, and that is why the requirements for energy infrastructure operation here are very high. Without a step-by-step implementation of these measures, the damage caused by the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident would have been much greater. A constant practice of work under the conditions of strict restrictions and regulations has formed in Japan stable mechanisms to counter emergency situations and relatively rapidly mitigate consequences while preventing critical damage to the population. Therefore, the study of the experience of Japan, the first nation in the world that adopted and started to realize a purposeful strategy for the development of hydrogen energy, constitutes a great scientific and practical interest.

The 75th anniversary of the end of World War II provides an opportunity for a new understanding of the global historical significance of Japan's defeat, as well as for evaluating this event from the point of view of present-day relations between Japan and its former adversaries. For many decades, a whole tangle of specific problems of the historical past related to the legacy of WWII has not lost its relevance in these relations. In fact, different countries have developed their own national-oriented discourses around the war with Japan, in which different accents are placed in the interpretation of its essence, character, main actors, and even chronology. In the West, the question of Japan's responsibility was generally considered to be closed by the terms of the post-war settlement determined by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, as well as by the verdicts of the Tokyo and other tribunals that punished Japanese war criminals. Their position during the cold war was determined primarily by the logic of bipolar confrontation, in which Japan was a faithful proponent of Western values in Asia in the global paradigm of the fight against communism. As for the USSR and post-Soviet Russia, it does not have any “historical” (not only legal, but also moral and ethical) claims against Japan related to the results of the war. In turn, in China, as well as the states of the Korean Peninsula, anti-Japanese sentiment prevails, due to the insufficient degree of public expression of remorse for the militaristic past on the part of official Tokyo, in whose policy, in their opinion, the revisionist component is growing. Their painful reaction is caused by statements of Japanese officials, and especially the head of government, which justify the militaristic policy of Japan during the war, by the visits of Cabinet members to the Yasukuni Shrine, by the publication of ‘patriotic’ history textbooks for secondary schools, etc. These countries hear from Japan both voices of admission and denial of guilt, and this complicates the bilateral dialogue at the political level. As a result, the establishment of a relationship of trust between Japan and East Asian countries seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.

The article is devoted to the process of normalization of Japanese-Korean relations in 1953-1965. The USA were an active participant throughout all of this process. The American side, which contributed to the start of the negotiations in 1953, evaded direct participation in them for a long time. The bilateral format of the process with an equidistant distance from it did not lead to quick results. However, in the face of escalation of the war in Vietnam, the U.S. began to need to normalize the situation in the north-eastern part of its Far Eastern strategic perimeter. Under these circumstances, one of the levers of pressure on both sides were the U.S.-Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security guarantees, according to which U.S. readiness to defend the Japanese islands became the main element of Tokyo's defense policy. In Seoul, it awakened a sense of vulnerability, infringed on nationalist self-esteem and stimulated official attempts to balance it with countervailing gestures from the U.S. and concessions from Tokyo. Formally, Washington continued to be a “good offices” provider, but in fact increased pressure on both sides. As a result, Park Chung-hee government agreed with Japan on terms that were advantageous to Korea in that environment, but unable to accommodate Korean nationalists who continued to suspect the U.S. of displaying pro-Japanese foreign policy. The Japan-Korea conflict was somewhat eased, but not resolved, and the U.S. benefited most from the situation. Not only did it temporarily stabilize relations between its two major regional allies, but it also succeeded in shifting the burden of maintaining Korean armed forces to Japan.

In 2020, the bilateral track of Russo-Japanese relations entered a period of new uncertainty. This was caused by several factors, both internal and external relative to the two nations. First, the futility of the policy of the Abe government aimed at using economic cooperation and personal contacts between leaders to induce territorial concessions on the part of Russia became obvious. This, in turn, was caused by the meagerness of results of economic cooperation, which was unable to produce a qualitative shift in the structure of Russo-Japanese economic ties, as well as the Japanese side’s underestimation of the degree to which the disputed territories were important for Russian public opinion. Second, after the resignation of the Abe government, the Suga administration took its place, and, seemingly, it is intent on emphasizing Japan’s territorial claims in a more direct fashion. Third, the COVID-19 pandemic dealt a blow to the economic ties of the two nations and forced their leaders to focus on domestic problems. Fourth, the contradictions between the US and China, which will probably not be resolved even after a Democratic administration takes over, mean that Russia and Japan unwillingly find themselves on the opposite sides of the barricades in this developing global confrontation. Therefore, even if Moscow and Tokyo have no substantial reasons to consider each other potential enemies, the growing international tension means that steps to strengthen its military power taken by one side will be met with increasing suspicion by the other. What would be the most rational strategy under these conditions for both Moscow and Tokyo is to attempt to, first, preserve the achievements that have already been made, and second, to show restraint and understanding towards the national security policies of the opposite party.

This article is a review of the collective monograph “Japan in the Retrospective of Generation Change”. The main object of study here are the changes which happened to two young generations of Japanese people whose lives were influenced by complicated reality of the past 30 years when the economy started to stagnate and rate of economic growth slowed down. Authors of this monograph are making an attempt to figure out what do such matters as family, labor, leisure time mean to modern Japanese people and also analyze their attitude towards the global society and specifically their attitude to the USA, China and Russia. Here one can also find information concerning gender issues in Japan, modern Japanese women outlook on their relationship with the men matter, marriage, career and political ambitions.